| 0 | official:doc:war-pursue-uap-release:asset:dow-uap-d48-report-september-1996-pdf:17a8cc07fd8c:frontier-ocr:chunk:0 | === Page 1 === RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE RTI Contract No. FO4703-91-C-0112 RTI Report No. RTI/5180/77-43F September 10, 1996 Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations Final Report Prepared for Department of the Air Force 45th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office - 45 SW/SE Patrick AFB, FL 32925 and Department of the Air Force 30th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office - 30 SW/SE Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437 19961025 122 Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors to protect administrative/ operational use data, 10 September 96. Other requests for this document shall be referred to the 30th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office (30 SW/SE), Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437, or 45th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office (45 SW/SE), Patrick AFB, FL 32925. DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 8 3000 N. Atlantic Avenue • Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931-5029 USA === Page 2 === 303O-TR-96-12 Contract No. FO4703-91-C-0112 RTI Report No. RTI/5180/77-43F Task No. 10/95-77, Subtask 2.0 September 10, 1996 Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations Final Report Prepared by James A. Ward, Jr. Robert M. Montgomery of Research Triangle Institute Center for Aerospace Technology Launch Systems Safety Department Prepared for Department of the Air Force 45th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office - 45 SW/SE Patrick AFB, FL 32925 and… [S2] |
| 1 | official:doc:war-pursue-uap-release:asset:dow-uap-d48-report-september-1996-pdf:17a8cc07fd8c:frontier-ocr:chunk:1 | SPC) Safety Office - 30 SW/SE Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437 Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors to protect administrative/ operational use data, 10 September 96. Other requests for this document shall be referred to the 30th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Officer (30 SW/SE), Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437, or 45th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office (45 SW/SE), Patrick AFB, FL 32925. === Page 3 === REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED September 10, 1996 Final 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Modeling Unlikely Space-… [S2] |
| 2 | official:doc:war-pursue-uap-release:asset:dow-uap-d48-report-september-1996-pdf:17a8cc07fd8c:frontier-ocr:chunk:2 | 22430 Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 300 RTI/5180/77-43F Torrance, CA 90505 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING Department of the Air Force (AFSPC) Department of the Air Force (AFSPC) AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 30th Space Wing 45th Space Wing Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437 Patrick AFB, FL 32925 3O3O-TR-96-12 Mr. Martin Kinna (30 SW/SEY) Louis J. Ullian, Jr. (45 SW/SED) 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES * Subcontractor ** Prime Contractor 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors to protect administrative/operational use data, 10 September 96. Other requests for this document shall be referred to the 30th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office (30 SW/SE), Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437, or 45th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office (45 SW/SE), Patrick AFB, FL 32925. C 13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) Missile and space-vehicle performance histories contain many examples of failures that cause, or have the potential to cause, significant vehicle deviations from the intended flight line. In RTI's risk-analysis program, DAMP, such failures are referred to as Mode-5 failure responses. Although Mode-5 failure responses are much less likely to occur than those that result in impacts near the flight line, risk-analysis studies are incomplete… [S2] |
| 3 | official:doc:war-pursue-uap-release:asset:dow-uap-d48-report-september-1996-pdf:17a8cc07fd8c:frontier-ocr:chunk:3 | . Certain Mode-5 malfunctions are simulated, and the two shaping constants then chosen by trial and error so that impacts from the simulated malfunctions and the theoretical density function are in close agreement. An appendix to the report contains a listing and brief narrative failure history of the Atlas, Delta, and Titan missile and space-vehicle launches from the Eastern and Western Ranges from the beginning of each program through August 1996. Each entry gives the vehicle configuration, whether the flight was a success, the flight phase in which any anomalous behavior occurred, and a classification of vehicle behavior in accordance with defined failure-response modes. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES launch risk, unlikely failure modeling, booster failure probabilities 180 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified SAR NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 298-102 === Page 4 === Abstract Missile and space-vehicle performance histories contain many examples of failures that cause, or have the potential to cause, significant vehicle deviations from the intended flight line. In RTI's risk-analysis program, DAMP, such failures are… [S2] |
| 4 | official:doc:war-pursue-uap-release:asset:dow-uap-d48-report-september-1996-pdf:17a8cc07fd8c:frontier-ocr:chunk:4 | simulated malfunctions and the theoretical density function are in close agreement. An appendix to the report contains a listing and brief narrative failure history of the Atlas, Delta, and Titan missile and space-vehicle launches from the Eastern and Western Ranges from the beginning of each program through August 1996. Each entry gives the vehicle configuration, whether the flight was a success, the flight phase in which any anomalous behavior occurred, and a classification of vehicle behavior in accordance with defined failure-response modes. Various filtering or data weighting techniques are described. The empirical data are then filtered to estimate (1) failure probabilities for Atlas, Delta, and Titan, and (2) percentages of future failures that will result in Mode-5 (and other Mode) responses. 9/10/96 i RTI === Page 5 === Table of Contents 1. Introduction...............................................................................................................1 2. Examples Showing Need for Mode 5 .......................................................................3 3. Understanding the Mode-5 Failure Response..........................................................7 3.1 Effects of Mode-5 Shaping Constants.................................................................9 3.2 Effects of Shaping Constant on DAMP… [S2] |
| 5 | official:doc:war-pursue-uap-release:asset:dow-uap-d48-report-september-1996-pdf:17a8cc07fd8c:frontier-ocr:chunk:5 | 6.1.4 Malfunction-Turn Results for Atlas IIAS....................................................35 6.2 Shaping Constants for Atlas IIAS.....................................................................37 6.2.1 Optimum Mode-5 Shaping Constants.........................................................37 6.2.2 Launch-Area Mode-5 Risks..........................................................................49 6.2.3 Effects of Mode-5 Constants on Ship-Hit Contours...................................51 6.2.4 Range Distributions of Theoretical and Simulated Impacts......................58 6.3 Shaping Constants for Delta-GEM...................................................................60 6.3.1 Optimum Mode-5 Shaping Constants.........................................................61 6.3.2 Launch-Area Mode-5 Risks..........................................................................64 6.4 Shaping Constants for Titan IV.........................................................................65 6.5 Shaping Constants for LLV1.............................................................................69 6.6 Shaping Constants for Other Launch Vehicles.................................................73 7. Potential Future Investigations..............................................................................73 8.… [S2] |
| 10 | official:doc:war-pursue-uap-release:asset:dow-uap-d48-report-september-1996-pdf:17a8cc07fd8c:frontier-ocr:chunk:10 | 41. Atlas Launch History ........................................................................................ 103 Table 42. Summary of Delta Vehicle Configurations ..................................................... 133 Table 43. Delta Launch History ........................................................................................ 136 Table 44. Summary of Titan Vehicle Configurations ..................................................... 147 Table 45. Titan Launch History ........................................................................................ 149 Table 46. Thor Launch History.......................................................................................... 165 9/10/96 vi RTI === Page 10 === 1. Introduction The debris from most launch vehicles that fail catastrophically tend to impact close to the intended flight line. Typical failures that produce such results are premature thrust termination, stage ignition failure, tank rupture or explosion, or rapid out-of-control tumble. Less likely malfunctions may cause a vehicle to execute a sustained turn away from the flight line. Examples are control failures that cause the rocket engine to lock in a fixed position near null, or failures leading to erroneous orientation of the guidance platform. Such failures should not be ignored, since they may… [S2] |
| 17 | official:doc:war-pursue-uap-release:asset:dow-uap-d48-report-september-1996-pdf:17a8cc07fd8c:frontier-ocr:chunk:17 | As still another example of a Mode-5 failure response, a guided Red Tigress sounding rocket was launched from Pad 20 at Cape Canaveral on 20 Aug 91. Within a second or two after clearing the launcher, the rocket made a near 90° right turn, and flew stably in this direction until destroyed by the safety officer at 23.3 seconds. Pieces impacted some two or three miles from the launch pad. This failure might have been classified as a Mode-2 response if destruct action had been taken shortly after launch. 9/10/96 6 RTI === Page 16 === 3. Understanding the Mode-5 Failure Response Unlike failure response Modes 3 and 4, response Mode 5 (and also Mode 2) is not a direct function of time from launch. For Modes 3 and 4, the mean point of impact (MPI) for each debris class is fixed, once the failure time is established. At each instant there is only one possible location for the MPI for each debris class. On the other hand, the Mode-5 impact-density function for each debris class consists of a primary part and a secondary superimposed part. The primary impact-density function accounts for impact variability due to the erratic flight of the vehicle. It is used to determine the probability that the mean piece in a debris class resulting from vehicle breakup falls in a given area (say on a building or open field). The secondary density… [S2] |
| 47 | official:doc:war-pursue-uap-release:asset:dow-uap-d48-report-september-1996-pdf:17a8cc07fd8c:frontier-ocr:chunk:47 | compromise between new and mature liquid-propellant vehicles, a value of F = 0.996 has been assumed for new solid-propellant vehicles. The percentages shown in Table 15 for flight phases 0 - 2 have been obtained from Table 14. Similar information for flight phases 0 - 1 are given in Table 16. In future risk studies for the 45 SW/SE, RTI plans to use these relative percentages for mature and new systems. Table 15. Recommended Response-Mode Percentages for Flight Phases 0 - 2 | Response Mode | Mature Launch Systems (F = 0.993) | New Solid Systems (F = 0.996) | New Liquid Systems (F = 0.999) | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | 0.4 | 2.2 | 7.4 | | 2 | 5.4 | 4.5 | 2.5 | | 3 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 1.7 | | 4 | 86.2 | 80.4 | 73.3 | | 5 | 7.9 | 12.7 | 15.3 | 9/10/96 28 RTI === Page 38 === Table 16. Recommended Response-Mode Percentages for Flight Phases 0 - 1 | Response Mode | Mature Launch Systems (F = 0.993) | New Solid Systems (F = 0.996) | New Liquid Systems (F = 0.999) | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | 0.5 | 3.4 | 10.7 | | 2 | 7.4 | 6.6 | 4.3 | | 3 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 2.4 | | 4 | 81.9 | 74.5 | 67.0 | | 5 | 10.1 | 14.9 | 15.6 | Absolute probabilities of occurrence for response Modes 1 through 5 can be obtained by multiplying the absolute failure probabilities for flight phases 0 - 1 and 0 - 2 (Table 6) by the relative failure probabilities in Table 15 and Table 16.… [S2] |
| 48 | official:doc:war-pursue-uap-release:asset:dow-uap-d48-report-september-1996-pdf:17a8cc07fd8c:frontier-ocr:chunk:48 | occurrence for response Modes 1 through 5 can be obtained by multiplying the absolute failure probabilities for flight phases 0 - 1 and 0 - 2 (Table 6) by the relative failure probabilities in Table 15 and Table 16. The results are shown in Table 17. Probabilities are listed to six decimal places to show differences, not because all figures are actually significant. To obtain these results, more precise values for relative probabilities of occurrence were used than shown in Table 15 and Table 16. Table 17. Absolute Failure Probabilities for Response Modes 1 - 5 | Vehicle: | Atlas | | Delta | | Titan | | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | Flight Phase: | 0 - 1 (0-170 sec) | 0 - 2 (0-280 sec) | 0 - 1 (0-270 sec) | 0 - 2 (0-630 sec) | 0 - 1 (0-300 sec) | 0 - 2 (0-540 sec) | | Mode 1 | 0.000119 | 0.000121 | 0.000054 | 0.000051 | 0.000216 | 0.000250 | | Mode 2 | 0.001637 | 0.001665 | 0.000744 | 0.000698 | 0.002976 | 0.003437 | | Mode 3 | 0.000011 | 0.000012 | 0.000005 | 0.000005 | 0.000020 | 0.000026 | | Mode 4 | 0.018007 | 0.026738 | 0.008185 | 0.011212 | 0.032740 | 0.055200 | | Mode 5 | 0.002226 | 0.002465 | 0.001012 | 0.001034 | 0.004048 | 0.005088 | | Total | 0.022 | 0.031 | 0.010 | 0.013 | 0.040 | 0.064 | For each vehicle, the absolute probabilities for Modes 1, 2, and 3 differ slightly for flight phase 0 - 1 and 0 - 2. This… [S2] |